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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
MICHAEL RAY ANDERSON, : Case No. 990880-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for 
Aggravated Robbery, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-301 
(1999) 8c 76-6-302 (1999), in the Third Judicial District Court, 
State of Utah, the Honorable Anthony B. Quinn, Judge, presiding. 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this court pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (j) (1996) . See Addendum A (Judgment, Sentence 
and Conviction). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND THE STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
I. Did the trial court err in denying Anderson's motion for 
a continuance and a new trial when he was surprised by 
exculpatory fingerprint evidence? 
Standard of Review: "We review the denial of a motion for a 
new trial based on newly discovered evidence on the same basis as 
any other denial of a new trial motion--whether the trial court 
abused its discretion." State v. Loose, 2000 UT 11 1 16, 994 
P.2d 1237 (citing State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 793 (Utah 1991)). 
II. Did the trial court err in denying Anderson's motion for 
a directed verdict where the State failed to present sufficient 
evidence of aggravated robbery? 
Standard of Review: "•'We review the evidence and all 
inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in the light 
most favorable to the verdict of the jury.'' Reversal of a jury 
conviction based on insufficient evidence is warranted 'when the 
evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which 
he was convicted.'" State v. Leleae, 1999 UT App 368 % 17, 993 
P.2d 232 (citations and quotations omitted). 
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT 
Mr. Anderson's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence 
is preserved on the record for appeal ("R.") at 147 (minute 
entry), 335-40, 517-22 and 544-45. His motion for a continuance 
or a new trial based on newly discovered evidence is preserved at 
R.546-48 (motion for continuance); 674,667-82 (motion for new 
trial, minute entry, court's findings and conclusions). 
STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following statutes, rules and constitutional provisions 
are determinative of the issues on appeal: 
Robbery, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (1999): 
(1) A person commits robbery if: (a) the person 
unlawfully and intentionally takes or attempts to take 
personal property in the possession of another from his 
person, or immediate presence, against his will, by 
means of force or fear; or (b) the person intentionally 
or knowingly uses force or fear of immediate force 
against another in the course of committing a theft. 
(2) An act shall be considered "in the course of 
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committing a theft" if it occurs in an attempt to 
commit theft, commission of theft, or in the immediate 
flight after the attempt or commission. (3) Robbery is 
a felony of the second degree. 
Aggravated Robbery, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1999): 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the 
course of committing robbery, he:(a) uses or threatens 
to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 
76-1-601; (b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; 
or(c) takes an operable motor vehicle.(2) Aggravated 
robbery is a first degree felony.(3) For the purposes 
of this part, an act shall be considered to be "in the 
course of committing a robbery" if it occurs in an 
attempt to commit, during the commission of, or in the 
immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a 
robbery. 
Discovery, Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 (2000): 
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall 
disclose to the defense upon request the following 
material or information of which he has knowledge:(1) 
relevant written or recorded statements of the 
defendant or codefendants;(2) the criminal record of 
the defendant;(3) physical evidence seized from the 
defendant or codefendant;(4) evidence known to the 
prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the 
accused, mitigate the guilt of the defendant, or 
mitigate the degree of the offense for reduced 
punishment; and (5) any other item of evidence which 
the court determines on good cause shown should be made 
available to the defendant in order for the defendant 
to adequately prepare his defense.(b) The prosecutor 
shall make all disclosures as soon as practicable 
following the filing of charges and before the 
defendant is required to plead. The prosecutor has a 
continuing duty to make disclosure. . . .(g) If at any 
time during the course of the proceedings it is brought 
to the attention of the court that a party has failed 
to comply with this rule, the court may order such 
party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a 
continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing 
evidence not disclosed, or it may enter such other 
order as it deems just under the circumstances. 
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Motion For New Trial, Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 24 
(2000) : 
(a) The court may, upon motion of a party or upon its 
own initiative, grant a new trial in the interest of 
justice if there is any error or impropriety which had 
a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a 
party. 
Criminal Actions - Due Process of Law, United States 
Constitution Amendment V: 
No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law. 
Due Process of Law, United States Constitution Amendment 
XIV: 
No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, 
liberty or property, without due process of law. 
Due Process of Law, Utah Constitution Article I, Section 7: 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of the Proceedings, 
and Disposition in the Court Below. 
Motion For a Directed Verdict: Mr. Anderson was charged by 
information with one count of robbery on the basis that he 
"unlawfully and intentionally took personal property in the 
possession of Mervyns from the person or immediate presence of 
Ann Ma[jd]i and Sharlotte Billings, and in the course of 
committing said robbery used or threatened the use of a dangerous 
weapon, and/or caused serious bodily injury to Ann Ma[jd]i and 
Sharlotte Billings" pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302(a) 
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(1999). R.l. An arrest warrant was issued. R.3. The State 
later amended the information to include Elizabeth Ashdown as one 
of the victims. R.75. 
At trial, Mr. Anderson clarified with the State and the 
court that the State was proceeding under that variant of the 
robbery statute ("subsection (1)(a)"), and that the jury was 
instructed under subsection (1)(a) as well. R. 335-36,338. The 
State agreed that it was proceeding under that theory of robbery. 
R.33 7. The court likewise noted that the State was bound by the 
theory set forth in its amended information. Id. Mr. Anderson 
pointed out to the court that the "immediate presence" element 
under subsection (1)(a) could not be shown. R.33 8. The court 
responded that Mr. Anderson should raise a motion for a directed 
verdict at the close of the State's case. R.339-40. 
Mr. Anderson moved for a directed verdict when the State 
rested. R.517-21. He argued that the State failed to establish 
that he took property from the immediate presence of another as 
required by subsection (1)(a). R.518. He explained that robbery 
is a personal crime; that Mervynsf is not a person for purposes 
of robbery; and that each of the three Mervyns employees who 
testified stated that they did not know that property had been 
taken at the time they confronted the man in the foyer and 
therefore the man did not take anything against their will. Id. 
The trial court denied Mr. Andersonfs motion. R.522. It 
also gave the following jury instructions: 
Instruction 21: You are instructed that Mervyns is not 
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a natural person but rather is a corporation or other 
legal entity, and as such can only act through its 
employees or agents. The conduct and activities of 
Mervyns employees is considered the conduct and 
activities of Mervyns. 
Instruction 22: Before you can convict the defendant 
. . Of the offense of Aggravated Robbery as charged in 
the Information, you must find from all of the evidence 
and beyond a reasonable doubt each and every one of the 
following elements of that offense: 
1. That . . . defendant . . . took personal property 
then in the possession of Mervyns from the person or 
immediate presence of Sharlotte Billings, Ann Majdi, 
Elizabeth Ashdown of Mervyns. . . . 
4. That such taking was against the will of 
Sharlotte Billings, Ann Majdi, Elizabeth Ashdown of 
M e r v y n s . . . . 
R.172-73. 
Mr. Anderson objected to the jury instructions on corporate 
agency, asserting that they misstated the law and were misleading 
because property must be taken from the immediate presence of 
another in order to find him guilty. R.544-45. The court 
overruled Mr. Anderson's objection, reasoning that subsection 
(1)(a) contemplates corporate entities acting through their 
employees, and that the statute is not limited to robbery 
committed against natural persons. R.545. 
Motion For a Continuance or New Trial: Based on the new 
evidence concerning the absence of Mr. Anderson's fingerprints, 
Mr. Anderson moved for a continuance of his trial. R.54 6. The 
court denied the motion, reasoning that the absence of prints was 
not exculpatory and, at best, it was inconclusive as to guilt or 
innocence. R.547. The court also stated that Anderson made no 
showing that a print analysis could not have been done before 
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trial, that the police failed to meet the discovery request, that 
they withheld exculpatory evidence from him, or that he was 
prejudiced by the new evidence in light of other evidence against 
him. R.547,687. However, post trial, the court ordered the 
State "to test the shoe box to see if there was a match with any 
prints on the shoe box with those of the defendant. The shoe box 
was tested and some latent prints were visible. A comparison was 
attempted with the prints lifted, however, no match was found 
with those of the defendant." R.687. 
Anderson was tried before a jury and found guilty as 
charged. R.188-89,191. He was sentenced to a five-to-life 
prison term on September 3, 1999. R.197. He timely filed for an 
appeal on October 1, 1999. R.204-05. 
Post conviction, on October 1, 1999, Anderson moved for a 
new trial on the same basis. R.213-26. The court denied the 
motion on the basis that it was not filed within ten days of 
sentencing pursuant to Utah R. Crim. P. 24(c) (1999). R.241-42. 
Anderson filed a motion for reconsideration and reminded the 
court that it granted him a 30 day extension in which to file the 
motion. R.243-63. The court acknowledged the extension and set 
a hearing date on Anderson's motion for a new trial. R.264-68. 
On February 11, 2000, the motion for a new trial was heard. 
R.682. The court denied the motion. R.682,688. In its findings 
of facts and conclusions of law, dated March 12, 2000, the court 
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stated: 
(1) the defendant has failed to show that he was 
prejudiced by the Court's ruling denying the 
continuance of trial to conduct finger print analysis; 
(2) at the time of trial the requested finger print 
analysis was speculative, inconclusive and was not 
exculpatory. 
Post trial the Court granted defendant's request to 
test the shoebox and compare the prints obtained to 
those of the defendant. Test results were inconclusive 
as no match was found. Defendant's request for new 
trial, based upon the finger print analysis, is denied 
as no prejudice can be gleaned from the new testing. 
The evidence is inconclusive at best. 
R.688. 
Mr. Anderson timely filed an amended notice of appeal on 
March 14, 2000, from the denial of his motion for 
reconsideration. R.6 90. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On November 13, 1998, at a Mervyns store located on Fort 
Union Boulevard, Elizabeth Ashdown ("Ashdown"), a Mervyns 
security employee, was monitoring a close circuit television 
inside the store camera room. R.394,396. Her duty was to 
monitor for shoplifters. R.396. 
Ashdown observed an adult male and adult female in the shoe 
department. R.3 97. Although Ashdown did not observe an actual 
shoplift, she testified that the man exhibited typical "shoplift 
nervous behavior." R.397. Ashdown watched as the man selected a 
pair of shoes, sat on a bench, tried one of the shoes on, and 
walked around to test the shoe's fit. R.398. Ashdown then saw 
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the man exit the store. R.399. She also testified that the man 
looked up at the camera before he left the shoe department. 
R.397. Ashdown viewed an alarm light go off as the man exited 
the store. Id. She left the camera room to respond to the 
alarm. Id. 
By the time Ashdown reached the doors, another Mervyns 
employee, Ann Majdi ("Majdi"), had already responded to the alarm 
and was standing in the doorway looking outside, speaking to the 
man. R.4 00. Majdi approached the man and woman and asked if 
perhaps a Mervyns clerk left the merchandise tag on an item that 
they purchased. R.362. The woman did not answer and walked away 
I 
quickly. Id. The man stepped toward Majdi and seemed nervous. 
Id. The man pulled a knife from his coat pocket and held it in 
the palm of his hand, responding, "go ask her. Maybe this." 
R.363. Majdi testified that she was fearful when she saw the 
knife. R.370. 
Majdi stepped back into the doorway as Ashdown joined her. 
R.364. The man "went toward [Ashdown], showing the knife." 
Id. The man went back toward Majdi. Id. As he went back and 
forth between Majdi and Ashdown, he repeated "go ask her. Maybe 
this" three times. R.37 6. 
Ashdown testified that the man said, "I swear. Go ask her." 
R.400. According to Ashdown, the man gripped the knife in his 
hand and pointed it first at Majdi, then herself, back at Majdi, 
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then back at herself. Id. Ashdown told the man, "it's fine. 
Just leave.'7 R.402. Ashdown was frightened and focused on the 
knife during the incident. R.402,418. The man ran away. R.401. 
Ashdown never saw the woman that she previously observed on the 
video. R.404. Ashdown explained that the lighting was dim where 
the encounter occurred, and it was dark outside. R.438,440. 
Meanwhile, Sharlotte Billings ("Billings"), another Mervyns 
employee, was walking with Majdi just prior to the alarm 
sounding. R.444. They had just parted ways when the alarm went 
off and Majdi went out the door. R.445. Billings went to the 
door way and observed through the open doors the man with the 
knife looking at Majdi. R.445-46. She had an unobstructed view 
of the man's face. R.463. She described the man as holding the 
knife in a "threatening gesture" towards Majdi. R.447. Ashdown 
then ran out the door. Id. Billings saw the man "jump[]" over 
to Ashdown . R.446. Billings could not see what the man did 
with the knife at that point because her view was obstructed by 
the doorway. Id. Billings could not hear anything as she looked 
on, but stated that she was shocked and frightened. R.448. 
Ashdown and Majdi came back into the store, visibly shaken. 
R.404,414,448 . Ashdown reviewed the surveillance video and 
realized then that the man took the shoes. R.405. A shoe box 
was located with an old pair of Nike shoes in it, size 10. 
R.428. The shoe box listed a corresponding size of 10. Id. 
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Ashdown contacted the police thirty minutes after the incident. 
R.413-14. 
The case was assigned to Detective Doug McGrath ("McGrath") 
from the Midvale City Police Department. R.478. Unable to 
identify the suspect, he had the surveillance video aired on Fox 
13 News on November 24, 1998. R.479-80. On November 30, Sam 
Gonzales ("Gonzales") indicated that he might be able to identify 
the man, but asked to see the video two more times before doing 
so. R.514-15. Gonzales identified Appellant Michael Anderson as 
the suspect. R.515. 
On December 3, 1998, McGrath assembled a color photo 
spread consisting of six individuals, including a color photo of 
Anderson taken on October 24, 1998. R.381,482,549. He showed 
the photos to Majdi, Ashdown and Billings. R.482. He had each 
witness look at the photo array outside the presence of the 
others and he gave each one a written admonition. R.483-84. 
McGrath testified that each witness read and signed the 
admonition. R.484. The admonition reads as follows: 
You will be asked to look at a group of photographs. 
The fact that the photos are shown to you should not 
influence your judgment. You should not conclude or 
guess that the photographs contain the picture of the 
person who committed the crime. You are not under any 
obligation to identify anyone. It is just as important 
to free an innocent person of suspicion as to identify 
guilty parties. You are not to be influenced by the 
fact that the person in the photograph may appear to 
have a beard, mustache, or long hair. Do not be 
influenced by the fact that some of the pictures may be 
in color while others are in black and white. Please 
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do not discuss this case with other witnesses or 
indicate in any way that you have or have not 
identified someone. 
Id. 
Majdi picked Anderson out of the array. R.382. Prior to 
the array, she saw the surveillance video one time the day after 
the incident and talked about the incident with Ashdown and 
Billings. R.383. She did not provide any other description to 
the police beforehand. Id. 
Billings also picked Anderson from the array. R.453. She 
selected him because of his distinctive eyes and eyebrows. 
R.462. She testified that she looked at the suspect's eyes 
during the incident. R.463,472. She also saw the video one time 
three weeks prior to the array. R.466. 
Ashdown could not identify anyone as the suspect out of the 
photo array. R.416. She viewed the video ten to fifteen times 
before viewing the array. R.415. She gave a description to the 
police prior to seeing the video, stating that he was an adult 
Hispanic male with short, greased-back hair, wearing a polo-type 
golf shirt, a large dark Nike jacket, long dark baggy jeans. 
R.434. 
After the photo array, McGrath arrested Anderson pursuant to 
a warrant. R.490. Anderson maintained his innocence. He took a 
lie detector test which indicated that he was not lying when he 
denied involvement in the theft of the shoes. Anderson was 
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wearing a black pair of Nike shoes at the time of his arrest. 
Id. The shoes (size 10 H) were not the same size or style of 
shoes that were stolen from Mervyns*. R.490,499. McGrath did 
not search Anderson's residence to determine if he had any 
clothing that matched that worn by the suspect in the video. 
R.505,507. McGrath had no other suspects in the case, and did 
not follow up on any other leads, because Majdi, Billings and 
Ashdown identified Anderson as the perpetrator. R.507-08. 
McGrath collected the shoebox and the old shoes left therein 
into evidence on November 24, 1998. R.487,489,494. Anderson 
requested that the box be tested for prints. R.491. Anderson 
was told that there were no fingerprints on the box and that his 
request was denied. R.492,546. However, Anderson learned at 
trial that McGrath actually had the box tested for prints. 
R.487. Partial prints, which McGrath described as smudges, plus 
one almost complete print were lifted from the box. R.487-88. 
The prints were partially analyzed. R.492. None of the prints 
were compared with those of other people in an effort to 
establish the identity of the suspect. R.492. McGrath explained 
that he had not compared the prints on the box with other prints 
because the box had been handled by so many Mervyns employees by 
the time he collected it into evidence that it was 
"contaminated." R.488,509. The shoes themselves were not tested 
because it was not possible to lift a print off the fabric from 
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which they were made. R.493. 
Mr. Anderson presented an alibi witness, Barbara Smith 
("Smith"). Smith is the mother of Mr. Anderson!s girlfriend, and 
the grandmother of their child. R.524. Smith explained that 
Anderson and her daughter live in the mother-in-law apartment in 
her house, which shares a common kitchen with her portion of the 
house. Smith testified that Anderson had a barbeque with them on 
the evening of November 13, 1998. R.528. Anderson and her 
daughter then went to their apartment for the rest of the 
evening, coming down occasionally to get food out of the 
refrigerator. R.529. Smith testified that Anderson did not 
leave the house that night because he and his girlfriend were 
tending to her four year old child. Id. Smith also explained 
that Anderson did not borrow her car that night. Id. She could 
not state with certainty, however, that Anderson did not leave 
the apartment on the bus or with another person. R.534. 
Smith explained that she did not call the police immediately 
after Anderson was arrested to tell them that he was with her on 
the night in question. R.536. She testified that the police 
never asked her for such information, and although two officers 
came to her house, they did not want any information from her 
regarding Andersonfs whereabouts. Id. She further testified 
that she and Anderson do not always get along, and that she does 
not feel any particular loyalty toward him and would not lie for 
14 
him. R.536A. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court abused its discretion in denying Anderson a 
new trial upon newly discovered exculpatory fingerprint evidence 
that could not have been discovered with due diligence, that was 
not cumulative, and that would make a different result probable 
on retrial. The trial court also erred as a matter of law in 
misinstructing the jury as to the elements of robbery where it 
gave an instruction that Mervyns, a corporate entity, was a 
person for purposes of the robbery statute. Lastly, the trial 
court abused its discretion in denying Anderson's motion for a 
directed verdict where the State failed to present sufficient 
evidence of the "immediate presence" element as required by the 
robbery statute. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT A NEW 
TRIAL UPON NEWLY DISCOVERED FINGERPRINT EVIDENCE. 
The trial court erred in denying Anderson!s motion for a new 
trial upon newly discovered fingerprint evidence. R.682,685-88. 
A new trial is necessary in order to present new evidence 
establishing that Anderson's prints were not on the shoebox that 
contained the stolen pair of shoes. Moreover, as noted by 
Anderson in his motion for a new trial, additional testing of the 
prints would be 
crucial to the case given the fact that this was an 
eyewitness identification case. The State has access 
to a fingerprint identification system in which they 
15 
may easily analyze fingerprints and compare them 
against a large bank of fingerprints of people who have 
been fingerprinted. This was important information for 
the defense and would have been used to investigate 
whether the fingerprint belonged to someone other than 
the defendant and whether that person may have even 
looked like the person who was shown on the security 
video. 
R.671 (Anderson's Motion for New Trial). 
Pursuant to Rule 24 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure 
(2000), "[t]he court may . . . grant a new trial in the interest 
of justice if there is any error or impropriety which had a 
substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a party." Utah 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(g) (2000) similarly states, " [i]f 
at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to 
the attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with 
[discovery] . . . , the court may . . . grant a continuance, or 
it may enter such other order as it deems just under the 
circumstances." See also United States Const, amends. V & XIV 
(due process); Utah Const. Art. I, § 7 (same). 
The decision to grant or deny a motion for a mistrial lies 
within the discretion of the trial court. See State v. Loose, 
2000 UT 11 11 16, 994 P.2d 1237. 
The legal elements for analyzing a claim for a new 
trial based on newly discovered evidence are as 
follows: the moving party must demonstrate from the 
proffered evidence that: "(i) it could not, with 
reasonable diligence, have been discovered and produced 
at the trial; (ii) it is not merely cumulative; and 
(iii) it must make a different result probable on 
retrial." 
Id. (quoting State v. Martin, 1999 UT 72 % 5, 984 P.2d 975) 
(citing State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 793 (Utah 1991)). 
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The trial court below denied Anderson's motion for a new 
trial. R.682. The trial court made the following findings of 
fact: 
[After confronting defendant, whereby defendant] 
pointed [a] knife . . . in an aggressive manner . . . 
[and] fled on foot[, Mervyns] [s]tore personnel 
discovered that a pair of tennis shoes were missing and 
that the shoebox the defendant was handling had an old 
pair of shoes in the box. Several store personnel 
handled the shoebox prior to handing the evidence over 
to the police. . . . 
Police officers took custody of the shoebox. . . . 
At trial the prosecution presented the videotape 
evidence, the eyewitness testimony of the store 
employees, photo-spread identification and the 
testimony of Sam Gonzales. No fingerprint evidence was 
presented, as testing was not done because of the 
overwhelming identification evidence. 
Defense counsel requested a continuance of the 
trial in order to obtain finger print analysis of the 
shoebox. The Court denied the motion citing that 
defense counsel had previously continued the case and 
had ample opportunity to seek this testing prior to 
trial. The Court further ruled that the lack of finger 
print analysis was not prejudicial in light of the 
other evidence of identification and that the evidence 
was inconclusive at best. 
At trial the defendant presented an alibi defense 
and also argued the fact that no finger print analysis 
was accomplished. 
Post conviction defendant moved this Court for a 
new trial, requesting the testing of the shoebox in an 
effort to show that the defendant was prejudiced by the 
lack of testing. This Court ordered the prosecution to 
test the shoebox to see if there was a match with any 
prints on the shoebox with those of the defendant. 
The shoebox was tested and some latent prints were 
visible. A comparison was attempted with the prints 
lifted, however, no match was found with those of the 
defendant. 
R.686-87. The court made the following conclusions of law: 
This Court denies the defendant's motion for a new 
trial on the following grounds: (1) the defendant has 
failed to show that he was prejudiced by the Court's 
ruling denying the continuance of trial to conduct 
finger print analysis; (2) at the time of trial the 
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requested finger print analysis was speculative, 
inconclusive and was not exculpatory. 
Post trial the Court granted defendant's request 
to test the shoebox and compare the prints obtained to 
those of the defendant. Test results were inconclusive 
as no match was found. Defendant's request for a new 
trial, based upon the finger print analysis, is denied 
as no prejudice can be gleaned from the new testing. 
The evidence is inconclusive at best. 
R.687-88. 
The trial court abused its discretion because the discovery 
of fingerprint evidence merited a new trial in Anderson's case. 
See Loose, 2000 UT 11 1 16. First, such evidence "could not, 
with reasonable diligence, have been discovered and produced at 
the trial." Id. Anderson duly filed a pretrial motion for 
discovery pursuant to Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 16. R.17-
18 (Anderson's Discovery Request). The discovery motion 
expressly requested " [a]11 evidence tending to negate . . . [or] 
mitigate the guilt of the Defendant," plus " [a]11 evidence that 
the prosecutor may obtain in the future relevant to [Anderson's] 
case." Id. 
Anderson also expressly requested that the shoebox be tested 
for fingerprints. R.491-92. During cross-examination of 
Detective McGrath, the following colloquy ensued: 
Anderson: Well, detective, let's go right to 
fingerprints since you and I had a brief conversation 
about this before court this morning. One reason the 
box was sent back out for fingerprints is I called you 
and asked that it be sent out, right? 
McGrath: Actually the request that I received to 
fingerprint the box was - -
Anderson: But I had a conversation with you. Do you 
remember that? 
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McGrath: Yes. 
R. 491-92. McGrath also testified that the State requested that 
the box be fingerprinted. R.4 92. 
Anderson followed up with Detective McGrath by asking him 
about the status of the fingerprinting. R.492. The following 
colloquy establishes that Anderson was told that no fingerprints 
fit for analysis could be found. 
Anderson: And then recently I had a conversation with 
you where you told me there was no fingerprints found 
on the box? 
McGrath: At that time there hadn't been, no. 
R.492. 
Yet, despite Anderson's diligence in filing a discovery 
request, asking that the shoebox be tested, and in following up 
on that request, Anderson was never informed that the box was 
actually analyzed as evinced by the following colloquy: 
Anderson: Now today you're telling us that there are 
some fingerprints that they identified on the box? 
McGrath: Well, they have been partially processed, but 
they haven't been linked to anybody yet. . . . There 
are some prints . . . , some partial, one appears to be 
a full print; but as far as having them compared with 
anybody at this time, that hasn't been done. 
R.492. 
The failure on the part of the State to inform Anderson that 
the box was actually tested establishes that, in fact, the 
evidence "could not, with reasonable diligence, have been 
discovered and produced at the trial." Loose, 2000 UT 11 % 16. 
Indeed, the State's failure to inform Anderson about the testing 
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highlights the court's error in finding that Anderson did not 
exercise due diligence in requesting the fingerprint analysis. 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(b) states, M[t]he prosecutor 
has a continuing duty to make disclosure." See also State v. 
Blair, 868 P.2d 802, 807 (Utah 1993) ("prosecution has a 
continuing duty to disclose interviews and other discovery 
material to the defense on request"). The State's continuing 
duty to disclose exists even if the prosecutor himself is not 
aware of the fingerprinting, but a police officer working on the 
case is. See State v. Shabata, 678 P.2d 785, 788 (Utah 1984) 
(citation omitted). "Information known to police officers 
working on a case is charged to the prosecution since the 
officers are part of the prosecution team." Id. 
Accordingly, the discovery of the new fingerprint evidence 
merits a new trial, in part, because Anderson exercised due 
diligence in trying to get such evidence, but was otherwise 
precluded from doing so when the State neglected to inform him 
that fingerprinting had actually been done. See Loose, 2000 UT 
11 H 16. 
In addition, a new trial is required because the fingerprint 
evidence "is not merely cumulative." Id. No other fingerprint 
evidence was presented in this case. The Defense raised the 
issue of the fingerprint testing only to establish that it had, 
in fact, been done. R.491-92; see supra. At most, the colloquy 
between Anderson and McGrath established that the prints found 
had been partially analyzed but had not been compared to those of 
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anyone else, including Anderson. R.4 92. Nothing in this 
evidence established for the jury sitting in Anderson's trial 
that the fingerprints were not linked to him at all, as 
determined by the post-trial testing. Moreover, nothing in this 
evidence approximates the value of a positive identification of 
the prints, which could be located if Anderson was allowed to run 
them through the State's fingerprint databank. 
The State referenced the fingerprinting during its direct 
examination of Detective McGrath only to make the point that it 
would be inconclusive given that so many people handled the box 
beforehand such that it was contaminated. R.487-89. The State 
also raised the issue to emphasize that fingerprints would only 
serve to "confirm the identification" of the suspect identified 
by the Mervyns employees.1 R.489. Such evidence was never 
The State brought up the fingerprint evidence in the 
following colloquy: 
State: Did you do anything about those shoes? 
McGrath: . . . [S]ometime later there was a request to 
have the box and shoes fingerprinted. And I turned the 
evidence over to our evidence custodian to process them 
for prints. . . . I understand that there are partial 
prints on the box . . . but they have not been analyzed 
and compared with the defendant's at this time. . . . 
The shoes and box have been handled quite a bit by the 
store employees. Because of that, usually evidence is 
contaminated. . . . And with the material delay [in 
picking the box up from Mervyns'] . . . there is a 
possibility for contamination. 
State: Plus by the time you got the request for the 
prints, hadn't you already identified the defendant? 
McGrath: Yes. 
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raised for the specific purpose of exonerating Anderson; if 
anything, it was employed by the State for the opposite purpose 
of asserting his guilt. 
Furthermore, fingerprint evidence tending to exculpate 
Anderson, or exonerating him altogether, would not be merely 
cumulative simply because he presented one alibi witness, Barbara 
Smith. R.524-3 6A. Fingerprint evidence is qualitatively 
different from witness testimony in that it is positive, 
objective and neutral. Smith's alibi witness testimony, on the 
other hand, is subject to credibility determinations by the jury. 
As noted in James, neutral evidence such as a fingerprint "is not 
merely cumulative of a criminal defendant's testimony [or that of 
his alibi witness(es).] It is of a different kind and nature . . 
and it certainly could have a different quality in the eyes of 
the jurors." 819 P.2d at 794. 
Finally, the discovery of fingerprint evidence merits a new 
trial because it would "make a different result probable on 
State: What is the purpose of fingerprints? 
McGrath: Well, to confirm the identification. 
State: Do you ever use it when you have no knowledge of 
a suspect? 
McGrath: Yes. 
State: But at this point in time you already had the 
suspect? 
McGrath: Yes, sir. 
R.487-89. 
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retrial."2 Loose, 2000 UT 11 1 16. The State's case against 
Anderson was based entirely on eyewitness identification 
testimony that was neither overwhelming nor entirely compelling. 
See James, 819 P.2d at 795 (holding new evidence from neutral 
source would result in a probable different result where other 
evidence going to central issue of intent was "not overwhelming 
or compelling"). 
As noted in State v. Long, the efficacy of eyewitness 
testimony in general is inherently limited. 721 P.2d at 488-90 
(noting inaccuracies in acquisition and storage of memory; human 
propensity to compensate for memory gaps; and deleterious effects 
of personal experience, biases, subsequent events, prejudices, 
race differences, poor lighting, fright, and speed of events). 
"The United States Supreme Court has [also] acknowledged that 
1[t]he vagaries of eyewitness identification are well-known; the 
This prong of the analysis "is not a sufficiency of 
evidence test." Kvles v. Whitlev, 514 U.S. 419, 434, 115 S.Ct. 
1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995) (citing United States v. Baalev, 473 
U.S. 667, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985); Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963)) 
(clarifying showing that defendant must make in asserting that 
new evidence would result in a "reasonable probability" of a 
different result). "The question is not whether the defendant 
would more likely than not have received a different verdict with 
the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair 
trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of 
confidence." Id. 
Utah law similarly holds that this prong is not a 
sufficiency test. In James, the Supreme Court held that new 
evidence would make a different result probable because the other 
"evidence [going to defendant's intent - the issue at the trial] 
. . . , while sufficient, is not overwhelming or compelling." 
819 P.2d at 795 (emphasis added). 
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annals of criminal law are rife with instances of mistaken 
identification.'" Id. at 491 (quoting United States v. Wade. 388 
U.S. 218, 228, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 1932, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967)). 
The efficacy of the eyewitness testimony involved here is no 
less limited.3 Each of the eyewitnesses personally viewed the 
perpetrator in a dimly lit foyer, at knife-point, at night, 
within a thirty second time frame. R.402,438,440. Majdi, 
Billings, and Ashdown each testified that they were frightened 
during the incident. R.370,402,448. Other than Ashdown, who 
viewed the man briefly on a surveillance video before the 
confrontation, none of the Mervyns employees saw the man before 
the incident in the foyer. R.360-62,367,397,470; see infra Point 
III (discussing insufficiency of evidence). Ashdown admitted 
that she was focused on the knife during the entire incident and 
so could not later identify the man in a subsequent photo array. 
R.402,416, 418. 
There was no suspect in this case until Detective McGrath 
aired the surveillance video on Fox 13 news almost three weeks 
later. R.479-80. That alone generated the only identification 
of the suspect by Gonzales, a man otherwise unassociated with 
this incident, who told McGrath that the suspect looked like 
Anderson. R.515. Based on that information, McGrath assembled 
the photo array that was later shown to the Mervyns employees. 
R.381,482,549. 
3
 The jury was given a Long instruction. R.162-64 (Text of 
Instruction). 
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In the interim, Ashdown, Billings and Majdi viewed the 
surveillance video and discussed the incident amongst themselves. 
R.383,415,466 . The video provides a blurred picture of the man 
in the shoe department. See (State Exhibit 7 - Surveillance 
Video)4. The angle of the video is from high overhead, and is in 
black and white. Id. It does not provide a high resolution, 
close-up of the man. Id. When McGrath showed the array to Majdi 
and Billings, each one selected Anderson as the man who most 
looked like the suspect that they saw briefly in the foyer and as 
a blurred image in the video. R.382,453. Such an attenuated 
relationship between the fleeing man briefly seen in a dark foyer 
over a thirty second time period at knife-point, the fuzzy figure 
in the surveillance video, and Anderson who was identified by a 
third party not at all associated with the events on November 13, 
1998, does not provide a compelling or overwhelming eyewitness 
identification case. 
In addition, none of the other evidence presented at trial 
is strongly suggestive of guilt. For instance, there was no 
direct evidence that positively linked Anderson to the crime, 
such as the stolen shoes or the knife that Majdi, Billings, and 
Ashdown allegedly saw in the perpetrator's hand. R.490. The 
State likewise failed to locate clothing at the place where 
Anderson was arrested that matched that of the man seen in the 
4
 The original video that was shown to the jury was lost 
between Anderson's trial and his appeal. The record has been 
supplemented with an exact copy of the video played for the jury. 
See Order to Supplement Record (August 8, 2000). 
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surveillance video, to wit, a mid-length black Nike jacket or 
baggy black jeans. R.5 07. Moreover, the shoes worn by Anderson 
at the time of his arrest were a different size (size 10 M) than 
those stolen from Mervyns (size 10). R.499. 
Consequently, the fingerprint evidence would "make a 
different result probable on retrial." Loose, 2000 UT 11 % 16. 
At minimum, the post-trial testing, which established that 
Anderson's prints were not on the box, would have a strong 
tendency to exculpate Anderson. Moreover, if allowed to run the 
prints through the State's fingerprint databank to find an 
identifiable match, Anderson would be able to exculpate himself, 
provide the name of another suspect, and determine whether the 
new suspect looked like the man seen in the video and in the 
foyer by the Mervyns employees. 
The United States Supreme Court has held that similar 
evidence merits a new trial on account of its tendency to render 
a different result "reasonably probable" on retrial. See Kyles 
v. Whitlev. 514 U.S. 419, 434, 450, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 
490 (1995) (citing United States v. Baqlev, 473 U.S. 667, 105 
S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985); Bradv v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 
83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963)). In Kyles. a list of 
cars at the crime scene (including license plate numbers) that 
was not disclosed to the defendant warranted a new trial because 
it established that defendant's car was not there as originally 
alleged. Id. at 450. The Court reasoned that the evidence had 
value in countering an argument by the prosecution that 
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a grainy enlargement of a photograph of the crime scene 
showed [defendant's] car in the background. The list 
would also have shown that the police either knew that 
it was inconsistent with their informant's . . . 
statements or never even bothered to check the 
informant's story against known fact. 
Id. 
As in Kyles, the fingerprint evidence has significant and 
particular "value" since it would counter the State's allegation 
that Anderson is the man in the fuzzy, black and white 
surveillance video and impeach the eyewitnesses' testimony that 
he was the person they confronted in the dimly lit foyer. Id. 
It would also show that McGrath did not conduct as thorough an 
investigation into possible suspects as he could have and that he 
was mistaken in assuming that he had his man after the shaky 
eyewitness identifications from Majdi, Billings, and Gonzales. 
Id.5 In short, the fingerprint evidence is qualitatively 
different from either the eyewitness testimony or the other 
evidence presented in this case in that it is objective and can 
provide, at minimum, exculpatory, affirmative evidence that 
Anderson did not touch the box. The fingerprints can also 
provide a positive identification of the true culprit in this 
case which would exonerate Anderson altogether. 
The court's error in failing to grant a new trial in this 
case is all the more questionable given that it was aware that 
Anderson took a pretrial polygraph examination which indicated 
that he was telling the truth when he stated that he did not 
steal shoes from Mervyns. R.61-74 (Motion to Allow Polygraph 
Results). Although the evidence was excluded, R.138-39, the 
court should have been more receptive to the possibility that the 
State may have had the wrong person and allowed for a new trial 
so that another jury may hear the fingerprint evidence. 
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In light of the foregoing, the newly discovered fingerprint 
evidence merits a new trial under the factors in Loose, 2000 UT 
11 H 16. Accordingly, the trial court erred in denying 
Anderson's motion for a new trial. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR AS A 
MATTER OF LAW WHEN IT INCORRECTLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY. 
The trial court erred as a matter of law when it 
misinstructed the jury on the elements of aggravated robbery in 
an inappropriate effort to make the facts presented at trial 
conform to the aggravated robbery elements set forth in 
subsection (1)(a) of the robbery statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-301(1) (a) . 
Anderson was charged in an amended information with the 
"immediate presence" theory of robbery that is set forth in § 76-
6-301(1) (a) ("subsection (1) (a)") . R.75 (Amended Information)4. 
Anderson sought to clarify before trial began that the State did 
not seek to prosecute the case under § 76-6-301(1)(b) and -(2) 
The amended information provides: 
Count I, Aggravated Robbery, a First Degree Felony, at 
1146 East Fort Union Blvd., in Salt Lake Count, State 
of Utah, on or about November 13, 1998, in violation of 
[76-6-302] . . . in that defendant, Michael Ray 
Anderson, a party to the offense, unlawfully and 
intentionally took personal property in the possession 
of Mervyn[f]s from the person or immediate presence of 
Ann Majdi, Sharlette [sic] Billing [sic], and Elizabeth 
Ashdown and in the course of committing said robbery 
used or threatened the use of a dangerous weapon, 
and/or caused serious bodily injury to Ann Majdi and 
Elizabeth Ashdown. 
R.75. 
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("subsection (l)(b)"). R.335-36,338. That subsection provides: 
(1) A person commits robbery if: . . . (b) the person 
intentionally or knowingly uses force or fear of 
immediate force against another in the course of 
committing a theft. (2) An act shall be considered "in 
the course of committing a theft" if it occurs in an 
attempt to commit theft, commission of theft, or in the 
immediate flight after the attempt or commission. 
Anderson further informed the court that there were possible 
sufficiency issues to the extent that nothing was taken from the 
"immediate presence" of anyone at Mervyns. R.33 8. 
Both the State and the court agreed that the case was to be 
prosecuted under subsection (1)(a) of the robbery statute, and 
not (1)(b). R.337. The court further noted that the State was 
bound by the theory of the case it presented in the amended 
information, to wit, the "immediate presence" theory of robbery. 
Id.; see R.75 (Text of Amended Information - Included in Footnote 
4) . 
The court duly instructed the jury as to robbery under §76-
6-301(1) (a). That instruction, Number 22, reads: 
Before you can convict the defendant . . . of the 
offense of Aggravated Robbery as charged in the 
Information, you must find from all of the evidence and 
beyond a reasonable doubt each and every one of the 
following elements of that offense: 
1. That . . . defendant . . . took personal property 
then in the possession of Mervyns from the person or 
immediate presence of Sharlotte Billings, Ann Majdi, 
Elizabeth Ashdown of Mervyns. . . . 
4. That such taking was against the will of 
Sharlotte Billings, Ann Majdi, Elizabeth Ashdown of 
Mervyn[']s. . . . 
R.172-73. 
After denying Anderson's motion, which was raised at the 
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close of the State's case, the court instructed the jury that 
Mervyns, as a corporation, was a person for purposes of the 
aggravated robbery charge. R.522; see also Instruction Number 
21. Instruction Number 21 states: 
You are instructed that Mervyns is not a natural person 
but rather is a corporation or other legal entity, and 
as such can only act through its employees or agents. 
The conduct and activities of Mervyns employees is 
considered the conduct and activities of Mervyns. 
Id. The State also noted that the Utah Code defines "person" as 
an individual or a private or public corporation. R.547; see 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(8) (1999). In submitting the 
instruction, the court reasoned that the robbery statute includes 
legal entities like Mervyns that act through their agent-
employees . Id. 
The court committed reversible legal error because the 
instruction does not accurately or fairly relate the elements of 
robbery under subsection (1)(a). The Utah Supreme Court has 
stated: 
The jury must be instructed with respect to all the 
legal elements that it must find to convict of the 
crime charged, and the absence of such an instruction 
is reversible error as a matter of law. . . . "The 
general rule is that an accurate instruction upon the 
basic elements of an offense is essential. Failure to 
so instruct constitutes reversible error.". . . Thus, 
the failure to give this instruction can never be 
harmless error. 
State v. Jones, 823 P.2d 1059, 1061 (Utah 1991) (quotation and 
citations omitted); see also U.S. Const, amends. V & XIV (due 
process); Utah Const. Art. I, § 7 (same). 
The language of subsection (1)(a) of the robbery statute, 
30 
when read in conjunction with the theft statute, establishes that 
it contemplates only natural persons and not corporate entities 
such as Mervyns. Section 76-6-301 (1) (a) (robbery) proscribes the 
taking of personal property directly from a "person." The theft 
statute, on the other hand, does not address the taking of 
property directly from a person. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 
(1999). Rather, it proscribes the act of "obtain[ing] or 
exercis [ing] unauthorized control over the property of another 
with a purpose to deprive him thereof." Id. 
Indeed, it is the act of taking property directly from a 
person that elevates robbery to a second degree felony, or first 
degree felony if aggravated. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-
301(1) (a) & 76-6-302. By contrast, because a natural person is 
not involved in a theft, that offense is a class B misdemeanor 
where, as here, the value of the stolen property is less than 
$300. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412(1) (d) (1999) .5 
In light of the language of the respective statutes 
governing robbery and theft, the two statutes were intended to 
proscribe entirely different conduct: the former dealing with 
property taken directly from a person, the latter dealing with 
property not taken from an individual directly. There would be 
no rational legislative purpose behind having a theft statute if 
5
 Theft may be classified as a second degree felony if the 
"actor is armed with a dangerous weapon . . . or . . . property 
is stolen from the person of another." See Utah Code Ann. § 76-
6-412(1)(a)(iii), -(iv). 
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subsection (1) (a) of the robbery statute could be read to include 
non-natural persons. Accordingly, the trial court committed 
reversible error in instructing that Mervyns, a corporation, was 
a person under subsection (1)(a). 
The trial court's error is highlighted by the fact that the 
legislature saw fit to provide an independent provision in the 
Utah Code to address the use of force or fear directly against a 
person during the commission of a theft within the robbery 
statute. That provision states: 
(1) A person commits robbery if: . . . (b) the person 
intentionally or knowingly uses force or fear of 
immediate force against another in the course of 
committing a theft. (2) An act shall be considered "in 
the course of committing a theft" if it occurs in an 
attempt to commit theft, commission of the theft, or in 
the immediate flight after the attempt or commission. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301(1)(b) & -(2). As noted above, the 
court and the State expressly declined to pursue this theory of 
the case, even after Anderson brought subsection (1)(b) to the 
court's attention and warned that there were extant sufficiency 
issues going to the "immediate presence" element of subsection 
(1)(a). R.337-38; see infra Point III (discussing insufficiency 
of evidence). The court went further to assert that the State 
was bound to proceed under this theory of the case.6 R.33 7. 
The trial court correctly noted that the State was bound 
to proceed under the theory of robbery presented in the amended 
information. To proceed otherwise would violate Anderson's right 
under the State and Federal constitutions to be apprised of the 
charges against him. See Utah Const. Article I, § 12 ("accused 
shall have the right . . . to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, [and] to have a copy thereof"); Article 
I, § 13 ("[o]ffenses . . . shall be prosecuted by information"); 
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Moreover, neither the State nor the trial court amended the 
information against Anderson to reflect this particular theory of 
robbery. In fact, the amended information submitted by the State 
in this case reiterated that it sought to proceed against 
Anderson under the "immediate presence" theory of robbery, and 
not under subsection (1)(b). R.75 (Text of Amended Information -
Included in Footnote 4). 
Since the court's instruction does not accurately or fairly 
represent the elements of robbery under subsection (1)(a), "it is 
impossible . . . to determine or presume that the jury properly 
performed its weighing function." State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 
896 (Utah 1989) . If anything, the instruction only served to 
"confuse rather than enlighten the jury, since it concerns terms" 
that are not part of § 76-6-301 (1) (a) . Accordingly, Anderson's 
case should be reversed and remanded for a new trial. See Jones, 
823 P.2d at 1061.7 
U.S. Const, amend. VI ("accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation"); see also 
Utah R. Crim. P. 4(a) ("all offenses shall be prosecuted by . . . 
information"). 
In State v. Fulton, 742 P.2d 1208 (Utah 1987), the Utah 
Supreme Court interpreted Article I, Section 12 to mean "that the 
accused [must] be given sufficient information 'so that he can 
know the particulars of the alleged wrongful conduct and can 
adequately prepare his defense.1" Id. at 1214 (citation omitted). 
If the State was not bound by the charge as stated in the 
information, and appellate review was not conducted within those 
parameters as well, then Anderson would be denied his right to 
present an adequate defense. 
The United States Supreme Court recently held that a new 
trial is not required in cases where the trial judge failed to 
instruct on an element of the crime because the error was 
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III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING ANDERSON'S 
MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT WHERE THE STATE DID NOT 
PRESENT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF AGGRAVATED ROBBERY. 
The trial court erred in denying Anderson's motion for a 
directed verdict where the State failed to present sufficient 
evidence of aggravated robbery. R.147-48; see State v. Leleae, 
1999 UT App 368 1f 17; 993 P.2d 232 (citations omitted); see also 
U.S. Const, amends. V & XIV (due process); Utah Const. Art. I, § 
7 (same). As noted supra Point II, the case was charged under 
subsection (1)(a) of the robbery statute, which provides: 
(1) A person commits robbery if: (a) the person 
unlawfully and intentionally takes or attempts to take 
personal property in the possession of another from his 
person, or immediate presence, against his will, by 
means of force or fear. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301(1) (a) (Robbery); Utah Code Ann. § 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Neder v. United States, 
119 S.Ct. 1827, 1830, 527 U.S. 1, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999). 
Neder does not affect the long-standing rule in Utah that 
failure to accurately instruct on all of the elements in a 
criminal case can never be harmless. See Jones, 823 P.2d at 
1061. First, Utah appellate courts are not required to apply 
federal standards of review when presented with challenges to 
trial court determinations made under federal law. See State v. 
Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1265 (Utah 1993). Rather, this Court is 
required to follow the mandate of the Utah Supreme Court 
authority and conclude that harmless error review is 
inappropriate since failure to accurately instruct a jury 
requires reversal as a matter of law. See State v. Laine, 618 
P.2d 33, 35 (Utah 1980); State v., Harmon, 712 P.2d 291, 292 (Utah 
1986) (Utah Supreme Court refuses State's request to conduct 
harmless error review where trial court failed to instruct on 
elements of crime). 
Additionally, the error in this case involves a violation of 
not only federal due process, but also of state due process. See 
U.S. Const, amends. V & XIV; Utah Const. Art. I, § 7. Utah is 
free to apply an independent standard under the Utah Constitution 
and continue finding that such violations require reversal as a 
matter of law. 
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76-6-302 (1999) (Aggravated Robbery); R.75 (Amended Information -
Included in Footnote 4). 
The evidence, fully marshalled in a light most favorable to 
the jury's verdict, does not establish that Anderson took 
"personal property" from the "immediate presence" of another and, 
hence, fails to establish the elements of aggravated robbery as 
set forth in § 76-6-301(1)(a) and § 76-6-302(1)(a). See State v. 
Vessey. 967 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah App. 1998) (citations omitted) 
(party challenging sufficiency of evidence on appeal bears burden 
of marshaling evidence in favor of verdict and then showing that 
it is not sufficient). 
The evidence presented at trial going to the "immediate 
presence" element as set forth in § 76-6-301(1)(a) is as follows: 
- On November 13, 1998, a pair of Nike tennis shoes was 
taken from a Mervyns department store. R.428. 
- No Mervyns employee was aware of the theft of the shoes at 
the time it occurred. R.367,397,472. Rather, Majdi, Ashdown and 
Billings confronted a man after because he set off a store alarm 
when he passed through the doorway from the store to the parking 
lot. R.360,362,397,445. 
- The theft of shoes was later discovered when an old pair 
of Nike shoes were located in a new shoebox and stashed on an 
upper shelf in the shoe department. R.428. 
- Majdi testified that she was leaving work for the day. 
She was exiting through the door at the same time a man and woman 
were leaving. R.3 61. The security alarm sounded as they passed 
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through the doorway. R.360. Majdi asked the man and woman if a 
merchandise tag had been left on their purchase which might have 
set off the alarm. R.362. The man and woman walked away 
quickly. Id. The woman never answered, but the man turned and 
said repeatedly, Mgo ask her. Maybe this." R.362-63. The man 
seemed nervous and held a knife in the palm of his hand. R.376. 
He motioned in the direction of the woman he walked out with as 
he spoke. Majdi stepped back into the store, fearful of the 
knife. R.364, 370. The man ran away. R.366. Majdi did not 
learn until the next day that a pair of shoes had been taken. 
R.367. 
- Prior to the confrontation in the foyer, Ashdown, a 
Mervyns security officer, saw a man on a surveillance camera from 
the camera room. R.397. The man was accompanied by a woman. 
Id. Ashdown watched as the man tried on a shoe and walked around 
to check its fit. R.3 98-99. His behavior made Ashdown 
suspicious because he was looking up at the camera and exhibited 
other typical "shoplift behavior." R.3 97-98. She did not 
observe an actual shoplift. R.3 97. She was prompted to go to 
him only when she saw a light viz a vis the surveillance camera 
indicating that he set the alarm off as he walked out of the 
store. Id. She left the security office at that point to find 
out what was going on even though she was not yet aware that the 
man took the shoes. Id. 
- Ashdown approached the man in the foyer where Majdi was 
also standing. R.400. The man walked toward Ashdown with the 
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knife, gripped in his fist and pointed at her, stating 
repeatedly, "I swear. Go ask her." Id. The man went back and 
forth between Ashdown and Majdi with the knife and then ran off. 
R.401. Ashdown did not see the woman earlier seen on the 
surveillance video and who the man referred to when he spoke. 
Ashdown noticed just before the altercation ended that a 
merchandise tag was on one of his shoes and concluded that the 
shoes set off the alarm. R.402. She realized that a pair of 
shoes was actually missing when she reviewed the surveillance 
tape after the incident occurred. R.404-05. A new shoebox with 
an old pair of shoes (size 10 M) in it was also later found. 
R.428. The new shoes (size 10 M) were missing. Id. 
- Billings was walking with Majdi as Majdi was preparing to 
leave work for the day. R.444. Billings turned to go back into 
the store when she heard the alarm sound at the same time that 
Majdi walked out the door. R.445. Billings turned to see what 
was going on. Id. She pushed the door open and saw Majdi with a 
man in the foyer. Id. The man had a knife in his hand. Id. 
Billings watched as Ashdown ran out to assist Majdi. Id. 
Billings saw the man jump between Majdi and Ashdown. R.446. He 
held a knife in a threatening manner toward Majdi. R.446-47. 
Majdi and Ashdown came back in and seemed nervous and afraid. 
R.449. 
- Billings at no point saw the man take a pair of shoes. 
R.472. She had not seen the man in the store prior to the 
altercation in the foyer. R.470. She was informed that a pair 
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of shoes was missing later that evening. R.465. 
This evidence, even when viewed in a light most favorable to 
the jury's verdict, does not sufficiently establish the 
"immediate presence" element of aggravated robbery. See Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 76-6-301 (1) (a) & 76-6-302 (1) (a) . As the facts amply 
establish, neither Majdi, Ashdown or Billings was aware that any 
item had been taken from Mervyns when they initially confronted 
the man in the foyer to the store. R.367,397,472. Moreover, 
except for Ashdown, none of them were aware of the man's presence 
in the store until he sounded the alarm as he departed. 
R.361,470. 
For example, Majdi testified that she did not learn until 
the next day that a pair of shoes was gone. R.3 67. She was not 
even aware of the man's presence in the store until they both 
walked out the door together and when he sounded the alarm. 
R.360-61. Yet, even the alarm sounding did not alert Majdi that 
the man had necessarily stolen merchandise. As Majdi testified, 
the alarm can be tripped when a Mervyns cashier inadvertently 
leaves a merchandise tag on a legitimately purchased item. 
R.362. Accordingly, as a matter of policy, Majdi asked the man 
if he had a purchase, not if he stole an item. Id. 
Billings likewise never saw the man take a pair of shoes and 
remained unaware of the theft until after the altercation. 
R.472. She was not even aware of the man's presence in the store 
until the confrontation was occurring. R.470. She became aware 
of the stolen shoes later that evening. R.465. 
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Ashdown was aware of the man's presence via a surveillance 
camera. R.397. However, she never saw an actual shoplift on the 
surveillance video. Id. She did not personally confront the man 
until she saw that he tripped the alarm as he exited the store. 
Id. Even during the confrontation, Ashdown was not certain that 
a theft occurred; she only speculated that a pair of shoes was 
gone when she noticed a merchandise tag on the shoe of the man in 
the foyer just before he left. R.402. She learned that a theft 
actually occurred after she reviewed the surveillance video and 
noticed that the man wore a different pair of shoes as he exited 
the store than when he initially appeared on the camera. R.404-
05. She also later discovered a new shoe box containing an old 
pair of shoes stashed on the shelf in the shoe department. 
R.428. 
Given that no-one was aware of the man's presence in Mervyns 
until the confrontation in the foyer, let alone of the theft of 
the shoes, there was no "tak[ing] of personal property in the 
possession of another from his person, or immediate presence." 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301(1) (a). At most, the evidence 
establishes a theft, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1999), and an 
aggravated assault. Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-102(1)(c) & 76-5-
103 (1) (b) (1999) . Accordingly, the State failed to present 
sufficient evidence of the aggravated robbery charge. See Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 76-6-301 (1) (a) & 76-6-302(1) (a) . The trial court, 
therefore, erred in denying Anderson's motion for a directed 
verdict based on insufficient evidence. See Leleae, 1999 UT App 
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368 H 17. 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the foregoing, Anderson respectfully requests 
this Court to reverse his conviction and remand for a new trial 
on the basis that the trial court erred in denying his motion for 
a new trial or on the basis that it misinstructed the jury. 
Alternatively, this court should reverse his conviction for 
insufficient evidence. 
SUBMITTED this / 0 ^ day of August, 2000. 
CATHERINE E. LILLY / 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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SENTENCE sPRXSON 
Based76n%thefdefendant^sxconvictiori^oftAGGRAVATED .ROBBERY ;a ?lst{^ 
DegreeJFelony, sthe defendant;is _sentenced to an'indeterminate;term' 
of not-less 5than"five^years'and which may be life in the Utah State 
Prisonl 
COMMITMENT- is to ;begiri^immediately!' 
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: ., The defendant is remanded t ^ your, 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
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